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N**ew** Romb Feared By U.S. Since '6t

By EVERT CLARK

t

for almost 14 months that the antisatellite missiles are de-Soviet Union was developing ployed at few sites around the

late the treaty on outer space, dars and computers can figure awas deliberately calling them as Administration officials have out the trajectory they should to the attention of the West.

Why the Soviet Union should the West. t emphasized in recent months.

The treaty prohibits the sta-could presumably be used tioning of weapons of mass de-against the kind of weapons struction in space, but not the Mr. McNamara described todevelopment of the techniques day. But these, too, are still in the development stage.

for doing so. Furthermore, The United States has made weapons that do not stay in the decision to deploy a so space for one complete orbit called "thin" antimissile sysr are not considered to be in tem against the potential threat

ly tioning bombs in orbit, citing weapons. at inefficiency and high cost, mili

ion might "at least explore the advantages of such a system." The first test shot,

tion might have begun came on of Tyuratam more than a year Sept. 17, 1966. Since then the ago, exploded into hundreds of Russians have fired at least pieces in several different or11 development shots, the most bits. recent last Saturday.

bombs. In doing so they have pad, a new rocket or possibly concluded that any reasons the a new guidance system in an Soviet Union had for the flights had to do with the bombard-ment from space or from nearorbital trajectories.

Though the reasons do not seem strong enough to American Experts for stationing bombs in orbit in violation of an international treaty, they point out that Moscow once violated the voluntary moratorium on nuclear tests in the atmosphere when that suited its purpose.

The strategists argue that Moscow must have some reason it considers valid for spending the resources necessary to put objects into low semi-orbits 11 times in 13 months.

Defense Difficult

As Secretary of Defense
Robert S. McNamara confirmed today in announcing
United States knowledge of the
cests, a defense against such
a weapon is diffical sproved For Release 2004/06/23: CIA-RDP69B00369R000200100013-9

In the worst of circumstances there would be only three minutes' warning time. Even the orbital weapon's target is no known until it is 500 miles away from the target, when a called matter that the target is not bustle it. rocket motor fires to hurtle i down through the atmosphere

The United States has de Special to The New York Times veloped the techniques o washing down enemy satel lites but, as far as is known, analysts here have been worried lites but, as far as is known, and the state of the techniques or welloped the techniques or w globe.

Antiballistic missile weapons

of Chinese intercontinental the Although the United States results and the United States resul lected years ago the idea of sta sian missiles or near orbital

Since the United States elected years ago not to develop bombs in orbit, analysts here tal strategists have feared for have trouble trying to decide some time that the Soviet Un why the Soviet Union decided

The first test shot, fired out The first clue that explora- of the main Russian space base

In the intervening year the strategists have tried to research the release on orbital cating either a new launching older rocket.

Western experts apparently still do not know why this shot, and a second on Nov. 2, 1966, exploded. The destruction may have been deliberate to learn what kind of pictures the pieces of rockets presented on a defender's radar screens.

Neither shot was announced by the Soviet Union. On Jan. 25, 1967, a third shot in the test series was fired from Tyuratam.

This time, it was given the designation Cosmos 139. Cosmos is what Western experts consider a cover-all name for scientific satellites, unmanned flights of man-carrying capsules, military reconnaissance satellites and many other shots that the Soviet Union prefers not to discuss in detail.

Whereas the analysts first = thought that the Soviet Union hoped to hide the intent of the near-orbital tests, the shift to the use of Cosmos numbers and the use of a new format for an orbital bombing system. Furthermore, antisatellite announcements concerning the The development of such a weapons need a fair amount flights finally persuaded the weapons system does not vio- of warning before tracking radianalysts that the Soviet Union was deliberately calling them

do this is still not understood

here, according to knowledge sources. One view is that the Soviet Union would like to force the United States into spending enough money to investigate the techniques. Another is that the Soviet Union

is trying to use the flights to frighten the United States or perhaps Communist China.

Secretary McNarama served that if the tests were of orbital weapons, as "is con-ceivable," the Soviet Union

could "achieve an initial operational capability during 1968.1

Since last January, the shots in this series have been Cosmos 160 on May 17, Cosmos 169 on July 18, Cosmos 170 on July 31, Cosmos 171 on Aug. 8, Cosmos 178 on Sept. 19, Cosmos 179 on Sept. 22, Cosmos 183 on Oct. 18 and Cosmos 187 last Saturday.

Mr. McNamara said that the vehicles used to date would have a low accuracy and carry only one to 3 megaton warheads.

But sources here are con-cerned that these flights may be using only small developmental rockets and that larger ones might follow.

The Soviet Union has demonstrated the ability to put be-tween 40,000 and 60,000 tween 40,000 and 60,000 pounds of weight into orbit

with one rocket, far more than the weights involved in the near-orbital tests.

If the Soviet Union is developing a launching rocket in the class of the United States Saturn 5, as many officials believe, it could put into orbit nearly 150 tons of weight.